NTSB Says Helicopter Pilot’s ‘Spatial Disorientation’ Played Key Role In Crash Killing Kobe Bryant

1. Show me in the video where there's clouds fog or any whether conditions

2. Kobe did not pressure the pilot the pilot shouldn’t of flew in foggy weather no matter how many times he flew Kobe where he wanted to go GOD BLESS ALL THE FAMILIES OF ALL VICTIMS MAY THEY HAVE A LITTLE BIT PEACE IN THERE HEARTS ONE DAY AT A TIME

3. NTSB said Kobe didn’t pressure the pilot- how? Who was there when Kobe pulled him aside? Nobody! Kobe did pressure the pilot and his fame and EGO killed him and all those other insignificant people (nobody mentions their names- because who is famous? Whose fame got him killed?)

4. \\ GOOD NEWS #2 Feb 10 //// COVID % Fatalities in 50 nations studied 80% less THAN IN EU, attributed mainly to SIMPLE DIET * GOOD TRENDS in US & S-AM * 97% COVID-19 Deaths in Israel of those NOT vaccinated * Data below reported by listed below nations to JHU, WHO, etc. re-ordered here, less any change, under 2 scientific methods, reveal key survival dependence of GROUP-A NATIONS by SIMPLE-DIET * NOT IN EU * METHOD (1) * DEATHS/1M POP * Jan 26 v Feb 10 * Blg1,822-1,887 * UK1570-1,716 * Itl1,421-1,546 * Hung1,231-1,340 * SP1,280-1,314 * Fr1,097-1,176 * Sws1,097-1,129 * Prtg1,043-1,416 * METHOD (2) * % Fatalities of diagnosed in GROUP B * Feb 10 * NL1.44 * Fin1.44 * U.S.1.72 * Sws1.81 * Swd2.06 * Sp2.10 * Fr2.39 * Brz2.43 * Cnda2.58 * Grmn2.74 * UK2.85 * AU3.15 * Itl3.46 * Grc3.62 * Irn3.96 * Cn5.17 * Mxc8.61 * US EARLIER * Oct 22 2.75 * MID JAN 1.67 * Feb 10 1.72 * GROUP A * Sngp0.05 * Mngo.09 * Bhtn.12 * FarId.15 * Qatr.16 * Dbai.28 * StBrt.28 * StVnc.31 * Mldv.33 * Tlnd.33 * Bhrn.35 * Mlas.37 * Sysc.44 * Curc.46 * Icln.48 * CyId.49 * SrLn.52 * Kwt.56 * Cyp.67 * Mrtn.69 * Cub.72 * Bora-Bora.74 * Isr.74 * Npl.75 * Uzb.78 * BrtIl.88 * Aruba.91 * Vnz.95 * Twn.96 * StMr.97 * We r what we eat, differing by DNA-DIET. ['in',10M+REFRS.Google, Supermaneuverability, Wkpd/U-tube].

5. Who cares, he's dead a year.

6. To the point FAA helicopter training requirements do not meet the real needs required to make safe confident VFR or IFR flying or decision making pilots or do the rules that govern operations ensure safe operations.

   Cause in point; many pilots with an Instrument Flight Rules IFR rating have no IFR flight time or exposure in the clouds.

   So as for this accident a few questions and the answers that will set the stage for the outcome.
   Did the pilot have any flight time in actual instrument conditions experience?
   Did the pilot have any recent exposure flying instruments in the clouds?
   Was the pilot current IFR and more importantly proficient at flying IFR in actual IFR conditions in the clouds?
   Was the pilot proficient at the tasks and with the systems of the helicopter to responsibly and safely operate this helicopter other than just start it up and fly it.

   This is not anything personal it’s professional.

   Was this pilot just another instrument licensed rated pilot with no real time flying in actual IFR conditions in the clouds on an IFR flight plan?

   Yes this was a VFR flight but he knew the weather before he took off and that it was IFR in the surrounding areas so was he prepared to go IFR and was he professionally and personally capable?

   Having a instrument rating and being an instrument instructor doesn’t require getting or having any actual time in the clouds.

   When it comes to total flight time it means nothing if you don’t have experience in the conditions you are flying into or in an aircraft you don’t use the systems or understand those systems. It’s like a fancy car, we all can drive it, but do we know how to use all the accessories, all the bells and whistles and do we know how to employ all the emergency systems? And are we not just current at driving but are we proficient with all the tasks and maneuvers we will or might encounter? A flat tire and maneuvering to a stop at high speed or the engine hood popping open or sliding on ice?

   So did the pilot attend Flight Safety International FSI to receive his initial S76 systems training?

   Did he once a year or twice a year attend FSI to maintain currency and proficiency in the S76 for instruments, systems and emergency training for his rating and to fly FAA Part 135?

   The topic of HURRT Helicopter Upset Recognition Recovery Training for Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions IIMC and CFIT a few years ago was briefed at a major helicopter association convention. The FAA, and other safety representatives along with the HURRT expert a retired director of flight operations and chief test pilot was were their to talk safety and accident rate in the industry associated to weather and why HURRT should be part of our FAA ratings and licensing tasks.

   The audience was about 50 prior military and 200 plus civilian trained pilots. Questions were directed at the civilian rated pilots.

   How many of you during your IFR instrument rating training actually flew in actual IFR conditions? raise your hands…..None raised their hands.

   Next question, how many while you were getting that IFR instrument rating during training flew during the night?
   Raise your hands….. None raised their hands.

   Next question, how many of you have your IFR instrument instructor rating and of you how many of you have actual time flying instruments in the clouds on an IFR flight plan?
   Raise your hands….. None raised their hands.

   And for all instruments instructors who takes there students flying in actual IFR conditions in the clouds or instrument training at night?
   Raise your hands….. None raised their hands.

   This was just a small sample of our industry and at the largest helicopter convention for our industry. The answers to those questions were definitely not what one would expect but they identify the causal factors in these type of accidents that will continue without change in standards and requirements that govern helicopter pilots and operations.

   Sad through out the industry in my travels those answers to those questions basically remained the same. Oh there are the few that raise their hand and say they received instrument training and actually got to experience actual IFR conditions, and or have flown in actual conditions after receiving the rating.

   No one is required to get exposure to real actual conditions and or at night in a degraded visual environment during their training for a IFR instrument rating.
   All that is required is flying around in VFR clear conditions with a hood on so you cant see outside and you can get your IFR instrument rating. You can also get an instrument instructor rating and have never been in actual IFR conditions in the clouds. That’s not flying realistically or in actual IFR conditions in the clouds, so how can we give someone a license to do something when they have never done it or experienced it? And so ask ourselves, how can we expect someone to relate and understand the factors of actually flying in a degraded visual environment or on instruments in poor weather or IFR conditions if in training or in recurrency we never require them to actually fly or experience it other than simulated under a hood or in a simulator?

   Of course we can’t stop a pilot from making poor decisions but we can surely give pilots the basic tools, training and actual experiences to change the accidents and tragic outcomes.

   Training in inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions IIMC, helicopter upset recognition recovery training HURRT and the associated aircraft handling technics for recovery, weather emergency let downs, minimum airspeed and level turn course reversals, minimum rate of descent minimum radius flat turn, diverts or approaches and the human aspects with these situations and decision options are easily implemented, and needed for each level of every FAA rating and should be required to be revisited during the add on of a new rating and during all recurrent training.

   This accident should upset us all in the industry because this type of accident continues. So what is it going to take? The lack of attention on this topic and addressing the required tasks, and standards continues to be neglected on this issue.
   The FAA Practical Test Standards PTS for each license rating now called the airman certification standard ACS that combines the tasks and ratings in one document still falls way short from addressing the causal factors and issues directly related to these type of accidents in the helicopter industry.

   A few years ago the accident in NYC with the Augusta 109 weather related crash, and crash of the civilian Blackhawk scud running a few years ago to the HAI convention, the list goes on and on all with the same consistent reason for those accidents.
   A lack of proper basic rating and advanced training requirements to include currency and profiency and also the rules that allow for these operations.

   Again training in inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions IIMC, helicopter upset recognition recovery training HURRT and the associated aircraft handling technics for recovery, weather emergency let downs, diverts or approaches and the human aspects with these situations and associated decision options can be easily implemented. They need to be implemented at each level of every FAA rating and should be required to be revisited during add on new ratings and during all recurrent training.

   This pilot from what is known made poor decisions from take off to the incident and flying single pilot is also a factor for such a mission and the conditions should have dictated having two pilots. This S76 was more than capable to fly in IFR conditions safely. TAWs could would not have stopped this accident. The pilot and operator actions caused this accident, and the lack of FAA requirements and standards were also the casual factors.

   The cause of the accident in the end may change but if it doesn’t this was truly avoidable.

   The FAA licensing/ratings/recurrent training requirements are lacking and these accidents will continue without attention. This accident has high attention being it Kobe and his daughter, so I hope maybe this tragic type of accident will get the needed synergy for all to listen, change and mandate requirements.

   It’s truly very easy to turn the corner on this issue and improve the safety record on this issue. Safety pamphlets, newsletters and notices, with the continued flavor of, lets be safer and smarter, have proven they don’t work so let’s step up and do something real that will truly address the issues.

   We can implement some real change with simple tasks being added to each pilot rating and recurrent requirements and operational rules.

   So let’s stop the short cuts on training, licensing, recurrency and the rules that govern operations.

   This accident was truly avoidable. We need to take this topic to heart, because if standards and requirements remain the same then the accident rate with fatalities will continue.

   We owe it to this industry, the public and those that lost their lives to change the way we train, license and operate helicopters.

7. MSNBC = CONSPIRACY NEWS NETWORK= BRAIN WASHING = DEMOTWAT, WELL IT WORKED FOR HITLER.

8. evil pos you all are

9. Can you imagine if the pilot was married, family etc, having to hear that your loved one was the cause of almost a dozen deaths and one of those was a beloved NBA player and his daughter?

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